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In this paper we discuss the arguments for and against the adoption of price-level targeting. We 
review recent theoretical contributions, and illustrate the main differences between price-level 
targeting and inflation targeting in a simple New Keynesian model. We conclude that, contrary to 
conventional wisdom, price-level targeting can, in some circumstances, deliver better outcomes 
than inflation targeting. Its main advantage lies on the fact that it acts as a commitment device when 
the Central Bank is unable to commit to its future actions. However, even in the circumstances 
under which price-level targeting performs better, there are three caveats to be considered. First, a 
higher proportion of backward-looking price setters reduces the effectiveness of price-level 
targeting, because it weakens the expectational channel through which price-level targeting 
operates. Second, communicating a price-level target may be a difficult task for the Central Bank. 
Finally, price-level targeting itself is not immune to considerations of time-inconsistency. 
 
Resumen 
En este trabajo discutimos los argumentos a favor y en contra de la adopción de un esquema de 
política monetaria de metas de nivel de precios. Revisamos las contribuciones teóricas recientes, e 
ilustramos las principales diferencias entre esquemas de metas de nivel de precios y metas de 
inflación en un modelo neo-keynesiano simple. Concluimos que, contrariamente a la creencia 
convencional, un esquema de metas de nivel de precios puede, en algunas circunstancias, arrojar 
mejores resultados que un esquema de metas de inflación. Su principal ventaja reside en el hecho de 
que este esquema actúa como un mecanismo de compromiso cuando el Banco Central no puede 
comprometerse a acciones futuras. Sin embargo, incluso en las circunstancias en las que el esquema 
de metas de nivel de precios se desempeña mejor, existen tres desventajas a tener en cuenta. En 
primer lugar, una proporción alta de agentes que fijan precios teniendo en cuenta información 
pasada reduce la efectividad del esquema de metas de nivel de precios, ya que debilita el 
mecanismo de expectativas bajo el cual opera el esquema. En segundo lugar, comunicar una meta 
para el nivel de precios puede ser difícil para el Banco Central. Finalmente, un esquema de metas de 
nivel de precios no es inmune a consideraciones de inconsistencia temporal. 
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Monetary authorities in developed and developing economies have, as one of their main objec-
tives, to achieve price stability. In order to achieve this goal, many central banks formally use
inﬂation targeting (IT) as their policy framework 1. As noted by Ambler (2009) until the onset
of the current worldwide recession, inﬂation and output ﬂuctuations have been less volatile in
IT countries. Furthermore, as suggested by Carlstrom et al. (2009), one of the elements behind
the sharp decline in inﬂation persistence in the USA has been a more aggressive policy reaction
towards inﬂation.
Besides being the monetary framework adopted by many central banks in practice, in theory
IT can implement the eﬃcient allocation in a closed economy as discussed by Clarida et al.
(1999). In particular, the optimal policy calls for gradual adjustment of the policy rate in order
to bring inﬂation to its target (optimal) level. This policy prescription also applies to a small
open economy (Gali and Monacelli (2005)).
An alternative policy regime, that also ensures long run inﬂation stability, is price level
targeting (PT). Under this framework, the central bank acts to return the price level to its
original targeted growth path.
In recent years there has been some discussion about the advantages of PT over IT. In
particular, the conventional wisdom that sees PT as a regime that stabilizes the price level in
the long run, but induces more short-term volatility in inﬂation and output has been challenged.
On the one hand, various theoretical contributions have pointed out at the advantages of PT
over IT under diﬀerent circumstances2. On the other hand, the Bank of Canada is considering
PT as an alternative framework to be adopted in 2012 when the contract with the government is
renewed. In this context, several studies have investigated the advantages and costs of adopting
PT in the Canadian economy. Finally, some central bankers, notably Lars Svensson from the
Swedish Central Bank and Charles Evans from the FED, have argued that a transitory move to
PT can induce expectations of positive inﬂation. In a context in which the zero lower bound has
been reached, this mechanism reduces the real ex ante real interest rate and therefore stimulates
the economy.
The objective of this document is twofold. First, we discuss the arguments in favor and
against the adoption of PT. In doing so, we review recent theoretical contributions, as well as
the research agendas undertaken in Central Banks (notably the Bank of Canada), assessing the
beneﬁts and cost of PT. Second, we illustrate the main diﬀerences between PT and IT in a
modiﬁed version of Vestin (2006) New Keynesian model. In the exercise we undertake, we show
how the expectation channel is key in determining how PT under discretion can perform better
1Currently 26 countries have adopted this policy regime (Lim (2009)).
2See Svensson (1999), Vestin (2006) and Preston (2008), among others.
1than IT under discretion.
We conclude that, contrary to the conventional wisdom, PT can be in some circumstances
a more convenient alternative than IT. Its main advantage lies on the fact that PT acts as a
commitment device when the central bank is unable to commit to its futures actions. When
commitment is possible, however, IT can, in general, implement the optimal allocation. As an
extension to the current literature, Preston (2008) shows that PT may have a better performance
in an environment that departs from rational expectations, even if commitment is possible. In
particular, if agents do not have rational expectations and learn adaptively, the optimal policy
might best be implemented by explicit reference to the path of the price level rather than the
inﬂation rate.
Now, even in the circumstances under which PT performs better than IT, there are some
caveats to be considered. First, the strength of PT comes from the possibility to aﬀect private
agents’ expectations. Therefore, in models in which producers set prices according to past values
of relevant variables such as inﬂation, price level targeting is less eﬀective. In the limit, if all
producers are backward-looking, PT is ineﬀective. Second, another problem with PT arises from
its implementation. Communicating a target in terms of the aggregate price level is a complicated
task, and it may require a considerable length of time before the private sector correctly forms
expectations about the evolution of inﬂation and the output gap from the announcement that
monetary policy will seek to stabilize prices around a particular trend. Finally, PT arises as an
interesting alternative when there is lack of commitment from the monetary authority to future
policies. However, PT itself is not immune to considerations of time-inconsistency.
This document is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the main arguments be-
hind the recent discussion about the advantages (and costs) of PT. In Section 3 we present a
simple rational expectations model with sticky prices that can be used to analyze the relative
performance of PT and IT in the face of a cost push shock. In Section 4, we present numerical
examples that shed light on the main mechanisms that are present in this simple model. Section
5 discusses some extensions. In particular, we analyze the implications of introducing additional
rigidities and the consequences of assuming that agents do not have rational expectations. Sec-
tion 6 discusses, more generally, the main advantages and costs of PT versus IT. Finally, Section
7 concludes.
2 IT versus PT: moving away from conventional wisdom
As mentioned before, price stability, normally intended as low and stable inﬂation, is the primary
stated goal of monetary policy for many central banks around the world. Under IT, the central
bank is trying to stabilize the inﬂation rate around some target value. Such policy implies that
the price level can drift arbitrarily far away from any predetermined time trend, but inﬂation
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will eventually converge to its target level. In this case, transitory supply shocks may shift the
level of prices in a permanent way. As a consequence, as the forecast horizon increases, the
forecast-error variance for the price level increases.
An alternative policy, PT, stabilizes the price level around a deterministic trend. In this
case, the central bank acts to return the price level to its original targeted growth path. In
this case, a transitory shock to the price level, causing temporary above-average inﬂation, must
be followed by a correction implying below-average inﬂation, and vice-versa. Eventually, under
both regimes inﬂation can be stabilized in the long run, but only PT ensures that the price
level will be stabilized around a target level. Under IT the level of prices does not necessarily
converge to a given path. An illustration of this is given in Figure 1, showing the evolution of
CPI in an IT country, Chile. As is clear from the ﬁgure, the price level is not anchored to a
given path, although the inﬂation rate is converging to 3%.
As noted by Gaspar et al. (2007), the conventional wisdom in central banking circles is that
price level path stability is not an appropriate goal to delegate to an independent central bank
3. The intuition behind this claim is that, under a regime of price level path stability, a shock
to the price level, causing temporary above-average inﬂation, must be followed by a correction
3See Fischer (1994); Fillion and Tetlow (1994); Lebow et al. (1992) and Haldane and Salmon (1995).
3implying below-average inﬂation, and vice-versa. The use of monetary policy to move around
inﬂation, in order to stabilize the price level, implies an increase in the short-run volatility of
inﬂation. Furthermore, if prices are sticky, moving around inﬂation requires pushing output
above or below its potential level. Therefore, PT would induce more short-term volatility in
both inﬂation and the output gap. Hence, the traditional view is that PT induces a trade-oﬀ
between the longer-run beneﬁts of increased price-level predictability and the short-run costs of
increased variability of both prices and output.
In recent years, however, this conventional wisdom has been challenged for two reasons.
First, in recent academic contributions Svensson (1999) and Vestin (2006) have demonstrated
that in some circumstances PT can be a better alternative than IT. In particular, when the
central bank lacks commitment to future policies, implementing PT even under discretion (i.e.
reoptimizing in each period) comes close to the the ﬁrst best allocation. In this case, a shock
that deviates prices from target is going to induce the policymaker to try to stabilize prices
in every period. This leads to lower expected inﬂation. Private agents will incorporate this
into their price setting decisions, inducing a lower level of contemporaneous inﬂation. Hence, in
the face of supply shocks, the expectation channel under PT contributes to stabilize inﬂation.
This reduces the required contraction in output and, therefore, it improves the policy trade-oﬀ.
Hence, contrary to the conventional wisdom, PT is able, in theory, to implement an equilibrium
similar to the one in IT under commitment. In this sense, PT acts as a commitment device
when central banks are unable to commit to future actions.
Second, in the policy arena, the Bank of Canada is considering PT as one of the options
when renewing its contract with the government in 2011. This has generated an important
research agenda at the Bank of Canada, assessing the advantages and costs of implementing
PT. For instance, Kryvtsov et al. (2008) measure the welfare gains of switching from IT to PT
under imperfect credibility. They use a simple theoretical model (as in Vestin (2006)) in which
there is a gradual adjustment of the private sector’s beliefs about the policy change. They ﬁnd
that gains from switching to PT are positive, but small. Subsequently, Cateau et al. (2009) use
the DSGE model of the Canadian economy, ToTEM, to study the impact of switching to PT
in a similar imperfect credibility environment. They ﬁnd that, even if the policy change is not
completely credible, there are signiﬁcant gains from adopting PT. In this case, PT works as an
automatic stabilizer that works via the eﬀect of expected inﬂation on current inﬂation. This
mechanism is absent from the IT solution. Covas and Zhang (2008), compare the performance
of PT and IT in a model estimated for the Canadian economy. In particular, they consider a
sticky-price, dynamic, general equilibrium model augmented with imperfections in both the debt
and equity markets. They ﬁnd that, in general, PT outperforms the current IT regime. Again,
in this case the inﬂation expectation channel which is present in the case of PT is explaining its
better performance.
4In summary, the traditional view sees PT as inducing a trade-oﬀ between the longer-run
beneﬁts of increased price-level predictability and the short-run costs of increased variability of
both prices and output. The contribution of the recent literature has been to show that, under
certain conditions, PT can actually lead to an improved trade-oﬀ between inﬂation and output
variability. In particular, if the Central Bank is unable to commit to future actions (i.e. operates
under discretion) PT can approximate the commitment solution, because it can stabilize future
inﬂation expectations. To see how this mechanisms works, in the next two sections, we present
the results of simulating the dynamic responses of the economy to a supply shock, under both
P Ta n dI Ti nas i m p l eN e wK e y n e s i a nm o d e l .
3 The Model
In order to clarify the concepts previously discussed, we present a model based on Vestin (2006),
which is a simple version of a standard new keynesian model of the type discussed at length in
Gali (2008).
The supply side of the economy is described by the Phillips curve, which relates current
inﬂation with expectations of future inﬂation and current output gap:
πt = βEtπt+1 + κxt + ut (1)
where all variables are expressed as log-deviations from its steady state values. πt refers to
inﬂation in period t, xt denotes the output gap and ut is a cost-push shock that follows the
process:
ut = ρut−1 +  t
As explained in Gali (2008), the Phillips curve depicts the pricing decisions taken by monop-
olistically competitive producers that adjust prices with an exogenous probability 1 − θ. κ is a
parameter that depends on the degree of price stickiness θ, the intertemporal discount factor of
households β, the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion σ, the inverse of the Frisch elasticity ϕ and
on the measure of decreasing returns to scale in the production function α4.
In the Phillips curve, if prices are completely sticky (i.e θ = 1), then κ =0 . I nt h i sc a s e ,
changes in marginal costs do not have an impact on inﬂation, given that agents can never
reoptimize prices. On the contrary, if prices are fully ﬂexible (i.e. θ =0 )t h e nκ tends to inﬁnity.
In this case, the Phillips curve is vertical.
The household’s optimality conditions state that the allocation of consumption across time
depends on the real ex-ante interest rate. These conditions are summarized by means of the IS
4For a detailed derivation of this equation, see Gali (2008).
5curve:
xt = Etxt+1 − γ(it − Etπt+1)( 2 )
where it is the nominal interest rate. Notice that this equation relates the nominal interest
rate, which is the instrument that the Central Bank uses in order to stabilize the economy, to the
current output gap, given expectations about inﬂation and the future output gap. We simplify
the analysis by assuming that the Central Bank can directly manipulate the output gap and,
consequently, we can omit equation (2).







This equation can be derived from a second-order approximation to the utility function of
households, plugging in the appropriate optimality conditions of households and ﬁrms. Notice
that the cost-push shock introduces a trade-oﬀ in the decision problem of the policy maker: it
is not possible to fully stabilize xt and πt at the same time. Were ut absent from the Phillips
curve, the Central Bank would be able to fully stabilize inﬂation by stabilizing the output gap
every period. However, if ut  = 0 this will no longer be possible, and the policy maker will have
to choose the sequences {πt,x t} that minimize society’s intertemporal loss function.
3.1 The Central Bank and the delegation problem
We assume that there is a benevolent planner that indicates to the Central Bank which loss
function it should minimize when setting its policy. We are assuming, in a sense, that society
delegates the problem of how to handle monetary policy to an independent Central Bank,
provided that it minimizes a given loss function.
Following Vestin (2006), we consider three scenarios under which the Central Bank sets
monetary policy. First, we describe the problem faced by the Central Bank when it can credibly
commit to its announced policy. In this case, the loss function it minimizes corresponds to
society’s loss function. This constitutes the ﬁrst best solution, and provides the benchmark case
to which we compare the remaining outcomes5. The second scenario we consider is one in which
the Central Bank cannot commit to future policies, and seeks to minimize (log) deviations of the
output gap and inﬂation from their steady state values. This scenario correspond to IT under
5As in Vestin (2006), we follow the timeless perspective approach to compute the commitment solution. Dennis
(2010) points out to the fact that, in some cases, the timeless perspective solution may be dominated by the
discretion solution. However, since in our analysis we evaluate policies at their asymptotic equilibrium and are
not concerned about transition dynamics, the timeless perspective policy and the optimal commitment policy
coincide and we can conclude that the discretion solution can never dominate the commitment one.
6discretion. Finally, we consider the case in which, as before, the Central Bank cannot commit to
future policies, but now seeks to minimize deviations of the output gap and the price level from
their steady state counterparts. In this case, the Central Bank is pursuing PT under discretion.
3.1.1 The First Best Equilibrium: Inﬂation Targeting under Commitment
Under commitment, the Central Bank has to choose a sequence {xt+j,π t+j}∞
j=0 such that soci-






















t+j)+φt+j(πt+j − κxt+j − βπt+j+1 − ut+j)

It can be shown that the solution to this problem is of the form:
xt = −cpt−1 − dut (4)
pt = apt−1 + but (5)
where a, b, c and d depend on the parameters of the model, and pt is the price level in period







The previous results imply that the response of prices to shocks will be determined by λ,
which is the weight assigned to the output gap in the loss function. As λ goes to zero, society
cares relatively less about the output gap and, consequently, prices adjust fully to oﬀset the
eﬀect of the shocks on inﬂation. In this case the Central Bank does full inﬂation targeting. On
the contrary, when λ goes to inﬁnity, society does not care about inﬂation. This translates into
prices being highly persistent. It is easy to see, then, that the price level is stationary, except
in the limiting case in which λ →∞ .
73.1.2 Inﬂation Targeting under Discretion
When the Central Bank cannot commit to sustain future policies, it focuses on minimizing only
the current period’s loss function. This contrasts with the previous case, in which the fact that
there was commitment implied that the Central Bank minimized the whole discounted sum of
future loss functions. Because we are considering an inﬂation targeting regime, the loss function
that the government delegates on the Central Bank has the same functional form as the true
social loss function. However, now the weight on the output gap λ can be modiﬁed such that
the solution under discretion comes as close as possible to minimizing the intertemporal social
loss function. For this reason, we denote by ˆ λ the weight of the output gap in the delegated loss
function.












πt = βEtπt+1 + κxt + ut
In this case the solution is
xt = −ˆ dut (6)
pt = pt−1 +ˆ but (7)
It is obvious from the last expressions that, in the case of discretion and inﬂation targeting,
the price level is no longer stationary but, on the contrary, displays a unit root.
3.1.3 Price Level Targeting under Discretion
As in the previous case, we consider the situation in which the Central Bank cannot commit to
future policies. However, in contrast with the previous scenario, we assume now that the loss
function that the government delegates on the Central Bank implies minimizing deviations of
the output gap and the price level from their steady state counterparts. Notice that it is still
the case that society’s welfare is maximized when deviations of inﬂation and the output gap are
minimal. Nevertheless, the fact that there is no commitment on the part of the Central Bank
implies that the inﬂation targeting solution may be too far from the ﬁrst best solution. As we
will argue in the next section, providing the Central Bank with a loss function with diﬀerent
arguments from the social loss function may deliver policies that are closer to the ﬁrst best
solution.












pt − pt−1 = βEt(pt+1 − pt)+κxt + ut
It can be shown that the solution in this case is of the form6
xt = −˜ cpt−1 − ˜ dut (8)








Once again the price level follows a stationary process, except in the case in which the weight
assigned to the output gap in the loss function goes to inﬁnity. From this result, it is already
evident that the optimal policy with discretion and price level targeting delivers a trajectory
for the price level closer to the one arising from the commitment solution than the inﬂation
targeting one.
4 Numerical examples
In order to shed light on the mechanisms behind the three results depicted above, we propose
some numerical examples in which we compute the response of the Central Bank to a given
cost-push shock, under the three scenarios of interest.
We consider a benchmark parameterization in which we set β =0 .99, ρ =0 .8a n dκ = 1
3. λ
is assumed to be equal to 0.5. In the case of inﬂation targeting with discretion, it can be shown
that ˆ λ =( 1− βρ)λ. Finally, when we consider price level targeting with discretion, we choose
˜ λ such that7
6Notice that the solution to this problem is not trivial, since the decision variable of the planner is also a
state variable for future planners, which is reﬂected in the fact that V (·) depends on pt−1. The derivation of the
solution to this problem can be found in the appendix of Vestin (2006). The interested reader can also check the
paper by Soderlind (1999) for details on how to solve problems under discretion as the one depicted here.




9Figure 2: Impulse-response functions to a cost-push shock, ρ =0 .8
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We solve the model89 and simulate the path of the relevant variables in the economy for
a one standard deviation cost-push shock. Figure (2) shows the impulse response functions of
inﬂation, output and the price level under the three diﬀerent policy regimes. It is clear from
this ﬁgure that the price level targeting solution closely mimics the solution under commitment.
Under inﬂation targeting and discretion, however, the variables display a very diﬀerent path
than in the two previous cases.
The diﬀerences in the responses of variables under price level targeting and inﬂation tar-
geting, when the Central Bank cannot commit to future policies, are due to the expectational
channel embedded in each case. When the Central Bank follows an inﬂation targeting regime, it
only cares about stabilizing the current period’s inﬂation rate and the output gap. This implies
that, under a cost push shock, it will have to tolerate a negative output gap in order to damper
8The analytical representations of the solution are provided in Vestin (2006).
9Appendix A.1 contains the value of the policy functions’ parameters for each case analyzed in this section.
10Figure 3: Impulse-response functions to a cost-push shock, ρ =0
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the eﬀect of the shock over inﬂation. As the shock fades out in time, so does the response
of inﬂation and output gap. In this case, the Central Bank cannot exploit the expectational
channel, because it lacks commitment10. The price level never returns to its original level, as
the monetary authority only cares about the growth rate of prices, but not about the price level
itself.
By deﬁnition, in a price level targeting regime, agents in the economy expect that deviations
of the price level today will be reverted in the future. Therefore, producers know that a cost-push
shock today, which implies inﬂation this period, will translate into deﬂation in future periods,
as the Central Bank will correct the initial increases in the price level by subsequent decreases.
Given that prices are sticky, producers that can set their prices today will increase them less than
in the inﬂation targeting case, because of the anticipated future deﬂation. The exploitation of
this expectational channel, which is also present in the commitment scenario, allows the Central
10In this case, the Central Bank could make a promise that it will tolerate a deﬂation in the future. This
could attenuate, via expected inﬂation, the current impact of the shock on both inﬂation and output. However,
a Central Bank that optimizes period by period has the incentive to renege of this promise and avoid a deﬂation.
If this is internalized by economic agents, the equilibrium under commitment is not sustained.
11Figure 4: Impulse-response functions to a cost-push shock, ρ =0 .8, κ =0 .05
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Bank to, in the presence of a cost-push shock, stabilize the economy by handling in a more
eﬃcient way the inﬂation-output gap trade-oﬀ.
Figure 3 shows the evolution of the variables in the economy in the case in which the cost-
push shock is i.i.d. (i.e., ρ = 0). Although the main results are the same as in the previous case,
there are some remarkable features in this example worth pointing out. First, in the special case
in which ρ = 0, the price level targeting solution exactly replicates the commitment solution, so
there is no welfare loss associated to the lack of commitment. Second, under inﬂation targeting
and discretion, the response of the monetary authority to the shock lasts only for one period.
This is the case because in this case the Central Bank responds only to current deviations of
inﬂation. Therefore, the optimal response in this case is to let prices adjust during the period
that the shock takes place and never revert the increase in the price level. On the contrary, in
the cases of commitment and price level targeting, the response of the Central Bank prevails
long after the shock has taken place. The reason for this is that the monetary authority has to
gradually undo the initial increase in the price level by generating deﬂations. Again, because
deﬂations are credible under PT and IT under commitment, the actual level of inﬂation is lower.
12Figure 5: Impulse-response functions to a cost-push shock, ρ =0 .8, κ =1
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In this section we perform some robustness exercises to see whether the results previously de-
picted change when we vary some of the parameters of the simple model presented in the last
sections.
Figure 4 shows the impulse response functions when we consider κ =0 .05, which corresponds
to the case in which prices are more sticky. Price level targeting dominates the inﬂation targeting
solution under discretion, and it implies a less abrupt response of the output gap to the shock.
Once again, the diﬀerence in the response of variables between the cases of price level targeting
and inﬂation targeting under discretion can be explained through the expectational channel
that the Central Bank can exploit in the case of price level targeting. Given that prices are very
sticky, and given that, with price level targeting, agents expect future lower levels of inﬂation
(or even deﬂation) following the positive cost-push shock, the output gap need not respond so
strongly to the shock.
Finally, Figure 5 corresponds to the case in which prices are very ﬂexible, so κ =1 .W ec a n
observe that in this case, for the three scenarios considered, prices respond very mildly to the
13shock, and in the cases of commitment and price level targeting, the price level goes back to its
initial level as soon as the shock dies out. It is still the case that price level targeting dominates
inﬂation targeting when there is discretion.
4.2 Inﬂation targeting, price level targeting and the zero lower bound
After the ﬁnancial crisis of 2008-2009, there has been an active debate on how to deal with
situations in which the nominal interest rate hits its lower bound of zero and, consequently, the
economy is in a liquidity trap. In this respect, price level targeting has received attention from
the profession for two reasons. First, an economy that is in a price level targeting regime will hit
the zero lower bound less frequently than an economy with an inﬂation targeting regime under
discretion. Moreover, once in a liquidity trap, economies with price level targeting regimes can
exit the trap more easily than economies under inﬂation targeting.
The reason behind these results is, once more, the expectational mechanism embedded in
price level targeting. By this mechanism, during a deﬂation agents expect future inﬂations such
that the price level returns to its target path. Consequently, even with a ﬁxed nominal exchange
rate, expected future inﬂation causes the real interest rate to decrease which, in turn, boosts
output. Then, during a crisis as the one recently experienced, the decrease in the nominal interest
rate needed to boost the economy is lower with price level targeting than with inﬂation targeting
and, if a liquidity trap is reached, the price level targeting regime does the job of generating
expectations of future inﬂations, without having to resort to unconventional measures. Hence,
and as noted by various studies 11, the Central Bank is more eﬀective at shaping private-sector
expectations about future inﬂation by targeting directly the price level path rather than inﬂation.
On the other hand, Billi (2008) shows that simple price-level targeting rules provide an
”insurance” against downside tail risk (such as hitting the zero lower bound in a low inﬂation
economy). In this case, as before, price-level targeting may imply less variability of inﬂation
than inﬂation targeting, since policymakers can shape private-sector expectations about future
inﬂation more eﬀectively by targeting directly the price level path rather than inﬂation.
5 Extensions
As shown before, PT outperforms IT when the central bank lacks commitment. This results
holds in theory as well as in quantitative research that evaluates the relative performance of PT
in medium scale macro models. However, if commitment is possible, IT is able to implement the
ﬁrst best allocation. This conclusion is derived in simple New Keynesian models, with rational
expectations and sticky prices. In this section we review some the implications of PT in models
11See Coenen and Wieland (2004), Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), Gaspar et al. (2007), McCallum (2000),
Nakov (2008), Svensson (2003) and Wolman (2005) among others
14that go beyond the standard paradigm. In particular, we discuss the implications of considering
additional nominal frictions and removing the assumption of rational expectations.
Givens (2009) considers a New Keynesian model with sticky prices and wages. The ﬁrst best
allocation can be implemented by targeting a linear combination of wage and goods inﬂation as
well as the output gap 12. In this setup, a central bank pursuing PT under discretion is unable
to approximate the ﬁrst best allocation. In particular, this type of policy induces more volatility
in wage inﬂation, which has a negative impact on social welfare. A policy that targets, under
discretion, a linear combination of goods prices and nominal wages (both in levels) has a better
performance. In particular, a price and wage targeting regime (PWT), under discretion, is able
to approximate well the ﬁrst best allocation. This policy, however, is still marginally worse than
the optimal one. In summary, in this setup goods-price targeting generates greater deadweight
losses than inﬂation targeting. Conversely, assigning a nominal wage target yields outcomes that
are superior to goods-price targeting and inﬂation targeting. The gains from targeting the price
of labor can be traced to the importance of nominal wage inﬂation in the utility-based social
loss function as well as the sensitivity of wages to output gap ﬂuctuations via the Phillips curve.
Overall, in this setup IT under commitment is still the optimal policy.
In a diﬀerent contribution, Preston (2008), considers a model that removes the standard
assumptions about rational expectations and common information on the part of private agents
and the Central Bank. This implies that these economic actors do not necessarily hold common
expectations about future macroeconomic conditions. In contrast to the IT rule, the PT criterion
displays robustness to the model used by the Central Bank to construct projections. Even if the
central bank mistakenly assumes agents to have rational expectations, the price-level targeting
rule leads to stability under learning dynamics for many empirically reasonable parameter values.
According to Preston (2008), the diﬀerence between these two rules, in the case of learning
dynamics, is that the PT rule speciﬁes a diﬀerent kind of subsequent behavior when one ﬁnds
that (because the private sector does not behave as they were projected to do) one has failed
to achieve the target criterion precisely. Thus the diﬀerence between the two rules is a diﬀerent
commitment as to how one will react to seeing that one has missed one’s target. The PT rule
is more robust to learning dynamics and suggests that optimal monetary policy might best be
implemented by explicit reference to the path of the price level rather than the inﬂation rate 13.
On the other hand, it would be interesting to see the extent to which simple price-level
targeting rules compare to IT rules. In a recent paper Billi (2008) addresses this question, but
does not analyze the conditions under which this types of rules guarantee determinacy.
12This result is coherent with Blanchard and Gali (2010) conclusions: when prices and wages are sticky, a
Central Bank should target a linear combination of both.
13If the the Central Bank correctly understands agents’ behavior, it can implement the optimal targeting
criterion either based on IT or PT
15Finally, a theoretical extension is to analyze the extent to which price-level targeting is
desiderable in an open economy. There are some contributions on this topic (Cateau et al.
(2009) and Coletti et al. (2008). Those studies, however, are based on country speciﬁc models
and do not address this topic using a microfounded simple model, like the standard open economy
model of Gali and Monacelli (2005).
6 Caveats of price-level targeting
According to the discussion of previous sections, price level targeting achieves better outcomes
than inﬂation targeting under discretion. This result hinges on the fact that, with price level
targeting, the Central Bank gains access to a mechanism to aﬀect the private sector’s expecta-
tions which is also present in the commitment case. This mechanism is given by the fact that,
because in the price level targeting regime the Central Bank stabilizes deviations of prices from
trend, the price level is (trend) stationary. Under inﬂation targeting and discretion, however,
this is no longer the case. For the simple model we presented in section 3, this result is robust
to changes in the parameters of interest in the model, such as the persistence of the cost-push
shock and the degree of price stickiness.
In section 2 we review some of the recent literature on price level targeting and conclude
that, for a large class of models, price level targeting performs better under discretion than
inﬂation targeting. This evidence seems to point out, at least from a theoretical perspective, to
a supremacy of price level targeting in environments in which the monetary authority cannot
commit to future policies.
There are, however, a number of caveats to price level targeting. From a theoretical point of
view, as mentioned before, the strength of price level targeting comes from the possibility to aﬀect
the expectations of private agents. Therefore, in models in which producers set prices according
to past values of relevant variables such as inﬂation, price level targeting is less eﬀective. In the
limit, if all producers are backward-looking, price level targeting is ineﬀective.
Another diﬃculty with price level targeting arises from its implementation. Communicating
a target in terms of the aggregate price level is a complicated task, and it may require a consider-
able length of time before the private sector correctly forms expectations about the evolution of
inﬂation and the output gap from the announcement that monetary policy will seek to stabilize
prices around a particular trend.
Finally, price level targeting arises as an interesting alternative when there is lack of commit-
ment from the monetary authority to future policies. However, price level targeting itself is not
immune to considerations of time-inconsistency. Consider the case in which, due to a negative
cost-push shock, there is a deﬂation in the current period that will need to be oﬀset with future
inﬂations for the price level to return to its target. As explained, expectations of future inﬂation
16aid the Central Bank in stabilizing the economy. However, in future periods, the Central Bank
will have to put up with positive levels of inﬂation, even if the shock has died out. This creates
the same incentives for the monetary authority to rethink its policy as in the commitment case.
In fact, given that the actual social loss function is determined by equation (3), if we allowed
the Central Bank to reoptimize taking this loss function into account, it would change its policy
in order to stabilize inﬂation. It is in this sense that the time-inconsistency problem prevails in
the case of price level targeting.
7 Conclusions
In recent years there has been some discussion about the advantages of PT over IT. In particular,
the conventional wisdom that PT is not able to stabilize in the short run output and inﬂation
volatility has been challenged both by theocratical contributions as well as from quantitative
research. For policymakers this regime is becoming an alternative for a long term policy frame-
work (the Bank of Canada) as well as a temporary alternative to overcome problems related to
the zero lower-bound.
Under some circumstances, PT can be an attractive alternative to IT. Its main advantage
lies on the fact that PT acts as a commitment device when the central bank is unable to commit
to its futures actions. When commitment is possible, however, IT can, in general, implement
the optimal allocation. As an extension to the current literature, Preston (2008) shows that PT
may have a better performance in an environment that departs from rational expectations, even
if commitment is possible. In particular, if agents do not have rational expectations and learn
adaptively, the optimal monetary policy might best be implemented by explicit reference to the
path of the price level rather than the inﬂation rate.
There are, however, some caveats to be considered. First, the strength of PT comes from the
possibility to aﬀect the expectations of private agents. Therefore, in models in which producers
set prices according to past values of relevant variables such as inﬂation, price level targeting
is less eﬀective. In the limit, if all producers are backward-looking, PT is ineﬀective. Second,
another problem with PT arises from its implementation. Communicating a target in terms
of the aggregate price level is a complicated task, and it may require a considerable length
of time before the private sector correctly forms expectations about the evolution of inﬂation
and the output gap from the announcement that monetary policy will seek to stabilize prices
around a particular trend. Finally, PT arises as an interesting alternative when there is lack of
commitment from the monetary authority to future policies. However, PT itself is not immune
to considerations of time-inconsistency.
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19A Appendix
A.1 Policy function parameter values
The following table shows the values of the parameters of policy functions (4) - (9) and of the
weights ˆ λ and ˜ λ used in the numerical exercises described in the main text.
Baseline, ρ =0 .8 Baseline, ρ =0 κ =0 .05 κ =1
IT + Comm. a 0.6292 0.6292 0.9361 0.2685
b 1.2542 0.6292 3.6198 0.341
c 0.4195 0.4195 0.0936 0.537
d 0.8361 0.4195 0.3620 0.6821
λ 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
IT + Discr. a 1 1 1 1
b 0.7835 0.8182 4.3096 0.1018
c 0 0 0 0
d 2.5111 0.5455 2.0719 0.9788
ˆ λ 0.104 0.5 0.104 0.104
PT + Discr. a 0.7062 0.6292 0.9536 0.3631
b 1.2154 0.6292 3.7709 0.3307
c 0.2652 0.4195 0.052 0.408
d 1.1810 0.4195 0.8464 0.7227
˜ λ 1.5 0.672 9 0.7
20 
Documentos de Trabajo 
Banco Central de Chile 
Working Papers 
Central Bank of Chile 
  
NÚMEROS ANTERIORES  PAST ISSUES 
 
 La serie de Documentos de Trabajo en versión PDF puede obtenerse gratis en la dirección electrónica:  
www.bcentral.cl/esp/estpub/estudios/dtbc. Existe la posibilidad de solicitar una copia impresa con un 
costo de $500 si es dentro de Chile y US$12 si es para fuera de Chile. Las solicitudes se pueden hacer por fax: 
(56-2) 6702231 o a través de correo electrónico: bcch@bcentral.cl. 
 
Working Papers in PDF format can be downloaded free of charge from: 
www.bcentral.cl/eng/stdpub/studies/workingpaper. Printed versions can be ordered individually for 
US$12 per copy (for orders inside Chile the charge is Ch$500.) Orders can be placed by fax: (56-2) 6702231 




Vulnerability, Crisis and Debt Maturity: Do IMF Interventions 
Shorten the Length of Borrowing? 
Diego Saravia 
Noviembre 2010 
   
DTBC-599 
Is Previous Export Experience Important for New Exports? 
Roberto Álvarez, Hasan Faruq y Ricardo A. López 
Noviembre 2010 
   
DTBC-598 
Accounting for Changes in College Attendance Profile: A 
Quantitative Life-cycle Analysis 
Gonzalo Castex 
Noviembre 2010 
   
DTBC-597 
Fluctuaciones del Tipo de Cambio Real y Transabilidad de Bienes 
en el Comercio Bilateral Chile - Estados Unidos 
Andrés Sagner 
Octubre 2010 
   
DTBC-596 
Distribucion de Probabilidades Implicita en Opciones Financieras 
Luis Ceballos 
Octubre 2010 
   
DTBC-595 
Extracting GDP signals from the monthly indicator of economic 
activity: Evidence from Chilean real-time data 
Michael Pedersen 
Octubre 2010 DTBC-594 
Monetary Policy Under Financial Turbulence: An Overview 
Luis Felipe Céspedes, Roberto Chang y Diego Saravia 
Octubre 2010 
   
DTBC-593 




   
DTBC-592 
Evidencia de Variabilidad en el Grado de Persistencia de la 
Política Monetaria para Países con Metas de Inflación 
Benjamín García 
Septiembre 2010 
   
DTBC-591 
Mercados de Financiamiento a los Hogares en el Desarrollo de la 
Crisis Financiera de 2008/2009 
Gabriel Aparici y Fernando Sepúlveda 
Septiembre 2010 
   
DTBC-590 
The Financial Accelerator Under Learning and the Role of 
Monetary Policy 
Rodrigo Caputo, Juan Pablo Medina y Claudio Soto 
Agosto 2010 
   
DTBC-589 
Conventional Calibration Versus EDF Calibration 
Felipe Córdova 
Julio 2010 
   
DTBC-588 
Nowcasting with Google Trends in an Emerging Market 
Yan Carrière-Swallow y Felipe Labbé 
Julio 2010 
   
DTBC-587 
Inflation Targeting in Financially Stable Economies: Has it been 
Flexible Enough? 
Mauricio Calani, Kevin Cowan y Pablo García S. 
Julio 2010 
   
DTBC-586 
Heterodox Central Banking 
Luis Felipe Céspedes, Roberto Chang y Javier García-Cicco 
Junio 2010 
 